A aproximación á realidade política latinoamericana en referencia aos procesos de integración foi un dos obxectivos básicos da conferencia: Perú ante as ameazas e oportunidades da integración sudamericana, impartida polo profesor de Dereito Constitucional da Universidade de Piura, Carlos G. Hakansson. Dende o primeiro momento da intervención, o profesor Hakansson, expresou a súa intención de manter máis unha charla coloquio que de impartir unha conferencia. Nesta liña, a súa intervención estivo dirixida a amosarlle aos asistentes a situación social, económica e política de Perú, e ao mesmo tempo establecer unha comparativa entre o proceso integrador en Europa e Sudamérica, o que deu pé ás preguntas e reflexións por parte do público. Un dos temas tratados máis afondo, foi precisamente o das trabas que supuña para os países suramericanos a tentativa de copiar o modelo europeo de integración, que calificou como un proceso pausado, progresivo e afianzado. Precisamente a progresividade no seu crecemento foi un dos catro factores que destacou como elementos que posuía Europa e dos que adoecía Sudamérica. Os outros tres son a reciprocidade, baseada no respecto dos países membros entre eles, a igualdade existente entre os países europeos, mentres que en Sudamérica son moitas as rivalidades existentes, e a lealdade comunitaria, referida á capacidade de cumprimento dos tratados asinados pola Unión. Dentro desta temática de integración, tamén se fixeron múltiples reflexións sobre a Comunidade Andina ou o MERCOSUR, ambos os dous proxectos integracionistas de diferentes países latinoamericanos, que non tiveron demasiado éxito debido, entre outras razóns, á existencia de demasiadas declaracións de boas intencións, pero sen unha base xurídica e legal de apoio importante. Posteriormente, Carlos Hakansson centrou as súas reflexións sobre a situación que atravesou e que está a atravesar nos últimos anos o Perú, facendo especial énfase en tres temas: a democracia, as institucións e a economía. Sobre estes falou en termos críticos, e destacounos como os tres problemas básicos que amosa o seu país no proceso de desenvolvemento. A reducida asistencia de público fixo posible que ao remate da intervención do profesor Hakansson, todos os asistentes puidesen participar nun interesante coloquio, no que cada quen puido expresar as súas reflexións, dúbidas ou opinións.
Abstract
We can affirm that the Union has experienced a process of constitutionalism, to formalize a reality political-institutional and territorial organization on European scale. In a first step, the Europeans had thinking about the necessity to elaborate a Constitutional charter, that delimits with greater clarity the power, but it failed. About this problem, we found the solution in the anglosaxon constitutional conception that is most suitable for the understanding of that reality. In main lines, that conception is characterized because the constitutionals matters begins at the constitutional code but still develop at the jurisprudence.
Resumen
El trabajo aborda el estudio de la mencionada institución de garantía para el ejercicio de control abstracto de la constitucionalidad de las leyes, o normas con rango de ley, que vulneran por la forma o fondo las disposiciones de la Carta de 1993. La finalidad y naturaleza de la institución, las normas sujetas a este proceso ante el Tribunal Constitucional, los efectos de la sentencia, su fuerza vinculante y la inconstitucionalidad por conexión son algunos de los temas que versa la investigación.
Resumen
En el trabajo se afirma que existen fuentes del derecho que gozan de jerarquía constitucional y que, junto con la Carta Magna, conforman un conjunto principista, jurisprudencial y normativo conocido por la doctrina como el “bloque de constitucionalidad”; un concepto de raíz anglosajona pero denominación francesa, que también ha sido recogido en el Código Procesal Constitucional peruano. En el artículo se explica su significado y alcances a tener en cuenta por los operadores judiciales.
El caso del espionaje chileno en las fuerzas aéreas peruanas ha puesto en tensión nuevamente la relación de ambos países. Sin embargo, este tema está afectando otros ámbitos fuera de la seguridad nacional, como lo es el caso de las relaciones comerciales que se sostienen con el país vecino. Con un TLC vigente desde el 1 de marzo de 2009, ha entrado a debate el tema de su derogación por el contexto de malestar que se ha generado. El Dr. Carlos Hakansson, Decano de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Piura y titular de la Cátedra Jean Monnet de Derecho Comunitario Europeo (Comisión Europea), sostiene que vincular el tema comercial es un acto prematuro.
“Querer derogar el TLC o romper las relaciones con Chile y dejar sin efecto un TLC es poco prudente porque se estará afectando la economía de ambos países, a los exportadores, al flujo de divisas, los trabajadores, sus familias y los inmigrantes peruanos en Chile”, afirma el especialista en derecho constitucional.
Hakansson Nieto propone una mejora en las políticas de entendimiento de integración entre Perú y Chile. “El TLC está en ese camino pero debe primar la cordura y madurez para encarar los problemas. Definitivamente se trata de un tema grave y delicado, el Estado peruano ha enviado un informe documentado a Chile y hora nos corresponde esperar su respuesta y conocer las medidas que tomará. Tampoco debemos perder de vista que el daño causado es irreparable pues se trataba de información secreta.
Para el Decano de la Facultad de Derecho de la UDEP los conflictos entre nuestro país y el vecino del sur han sido reiterados en una coyuntura internacional en la que debe primar la integración. Los problemas de soberanía, armamentismo son políticas superadas en un mundo global. El espionaje sumado a la próxima resolución de la Corte de La Haya son temas que afectan la integración. Para Hakansson es importante una agenda regional para lograr la conciliación entre estos países. “En la historia reciente tenemos el ejemplo de la Unión Europea que ha logrado la reconciliación entre Francia y Alemania”, dijo.
El Perú debe conducir el tema por la vía diplomática, evitar los argumentos populistas, demagógicos e impedir que se incentiven marchas que propicien mayor crispación. El Presidente de la República ya repudió el incidente. “Él, como representante de todos los peruanos, ya se pronunció, no tenemos que seguir insistiendo. Debemos mantener la calma y dejar que actúe la diplomacia”, recomienda el especialista.
By Carlos Hakansson
Failure of popular consultations conducted in Holland and France to approve the Treaty which establishes a Constitution for Europe motivated the German Presidency of the European Council, and the delegates from twenty-seven member states, to present on 19th May of 2007 a reform project. As the first measure, it was decided to exclude the term “Constitution”, which aroused so much polemic, to promote the elaboration of a classic international document which would introduce amendments to the first project. In this way, the so-called reform treatment was signed in Lisbon by the representatives of all the European Union member states on 13th December of 2007 and it replaces the European Constitution project. Nonetheless, as it is of up most importance to pursue the concept more than the wording, regardless of the change in denomination, we think that the European Constitution project’s essence is alive and that the Lisbon Treaty has been a political transactional formula to approve a document with doctrinal resistance coming from a continental European conception of constitutional theory; due to this fact, in the present work, having the classic theory of this discipline as our basis, we propound an approach which defends the constitutional jurisdictions of the European integration process and the historical value of the unsuccessful attempt of a Constitution for Europe.
I. The American example and the European integration
WE, the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION for the United States of America.
We wish to begin this epigraph with the historical preambule to the Constitution of the United States of America. As we now, a document dating from the late 18th century, the first codified constitution if we do not consider the so-called government instruments for the United Kingdom, elaborated at the end of the 17th century during Oliver Cromwell’s Lord Protector of England . Naturally, the aim of this article is not that of conducting a study of this historical document, but to argue that the content of its preamble gathers wishes that could very well be identified with the political aspirations of the European People; let’s take a look and explain, phrase by phrase, the preamble to the United States of America Constitution and its similarities with the political project of the European Union:
A) In order to form a more perfect Union.
As we all know, Europe had some previous integration trials, such as the Benelux , the union formed by Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg; and other attempts, such as the European Defense Community (EDC), an international organization of military style which did not succeed . The ideas of Jean Monnet confirmed through time that the best bet was to start with economical integration to then achieve political integration.
B) Establish Justice and insure domestic tranquility .
It was evident that at the end of the second world war, the Europeans were looking for a strategic equilibrium between France and Germany, the birth of the constitutive treaties such as the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Union (EEU) and The European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom), sponsored the celebration of other agreements such as the Unique Record where the is evidence of the formalizing of some of the main government institutions, such as the European Council and a Parliament which saw, little by little, how its powers were strengthened .
C) Provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare .
We should also highlight the needs of Europe to look after its identity in terms of the two super powers which arised at the end of the Second World War and at the beginning of the Cold War. The need to conciliate France and Germany, for Europe to work together in order to achieve common goals , to promote not only a space for merchants but also for the citizens as well as the creation of a community environment.
D) Secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity .
The last phrase of this preamble which we have borrowed, in Europe can be translated to the progressive recognition of a Social Charter and then , more recently, of a Charter of Fundamental Rights . As opposed to the Latin american integration problems, history repeats itself; but the lesson is learnt; let’s not forget that the North American Constitution was nor born with a catalogue of rights and liberties, it was incorporated four years after with its first ten Amendments (Bill of Rights, 1791).
It is now time to make a comment to the beginning of the preamble, specifically to the expression about the European People , whether it exists or not. Let’s take into account that the first Americans, named delegates to revise and propose reforms to the Confederation given it was a model that had not been able in itself to conduct the Union. The delegates to the Convention, equivalent to a constituent assembly of the time, and in representation of the American People, instead of modifying the confederation; proposed a federal Constitution ; because of this, the expression the People of the United States is but an act of representation of such delegates to revise the content of the then American Confederation which resulted in the proposing of a federalism.
* * *
After this comparison we realize that the wishes of the first thirteen colonies in North America are not different from an integration process in our days, like the European one, and that their first attempt to confederate themselves could mean a sort of international treaty at that time; in this way we see that there are notorious reciprocities regardless of the time and the different circumstances, which leads us to think that the way to integration, and its risks, were known and experimented by the first Americans; in other words, the way is built it is just a matter of daring to walk it completely, with no stops. From this point of view, if the Americans saw that the process of integration was sealed with a Federal Constitution, which represented all federated status that also have their own Constitution, why was there so much resistance to the project for a formal Constitution, if, in practice, the European Union already has constitutional institutions?
II. The constitutionalist’s vision of the European integration process
The questions that a constitutionalist asks himself in the light of the European Union integration process are as follows: which are the competences that the member states maintain? which are those that will be part of the Union and which will be shared by both?, how will power be dispersed? And, finally, which rights will be recognized for the citizens? All of them are questions of constitutional nature which the unsuccessful 2004 project answered; due to this, constitutional theory could be of aid in giving an answer to the same issues that North Americans had at the time they faced the matter of building their federalism.
The idea of elaborating a text which would regulate the institutions of the European Union in harmony with the rights and liberties acknowledged, which under the first project was called Constitution, aimed at stating that the Union was created for the citizen and not only for the merchants; another reason was that a document was more convenient than a set of texts approved on different dates and cities, whose content did not replace the previous treaty but complemented it; it was therefore necessary to come up with a text that was summarized, ordered, systematic, with the features of a modern constitution (codified and direct enforceability with political institutions, institutional equilibrium, recognized rights and liberties). What was the problem for its ratification and functioning? Specifically, the objections were not of practical content, whether a constitutional text was viable or not, but rather if theoretical character, that is, an ideological proposal which might upset the conscience and tranquility of more than one jurist. We can summarize some of them:
A) The European Union is just an international organization, as any other.
B) The European Union still has a democratic deficit .
C) The project is a treaty, not a constitution.
D) That the text has been written by a group of specialists behind the people of Europe.
E) The text of the European Constitution is too long.
F) The European Union is not a State; due to this it cannot have a constitution. And finally,
G) The project for a European Constitution lacks legitimacy.
* * *
Constitutional theory can also help us in understanding these so-called problems and to observe them in their real dimension. First of all, to entirely associate the European Union with an international organization is similar to looking at the Euro on only one of its sides when it has two, a national face and a community one; it seems that, the specialists in Economical Science understood it better from their own perspective.
It is also true that the European Union has an evident internationalist dimension since its birth was due to the traditional instruments, and the measures that international public law has at its disposition for the creation of any organization between states (treaties, agreements, charters and international agreements), but it is impossible to not see a supranational legislation and jurisdiction, that is, the possibility that its community law (originating and derived) and resolutions have primacy and benefit from a direct effect in all European political communities ; two attributions that do not yet enjoy the paradigm institutions of the international organizations, such as the UN or the OAS, whose resolutions have the effect of recommendations not necessarily entailing and lacking coercion, but of international repudiation when not obeyed.
In second place, it seems ironic to say that the European Union has a democratic deficit due to the government’s decisions mechanism, accusing it several times that its politics are made behind the citizens’ backs. Let’s take into account that the political communities which form it do not use the measures of direct democracy, popular consultations, revocations, with the same regularity demanded by the European Union. We should remember that modern democracy is representative and the election of Euro members of Parliament through universal voting is an eloquent manifestation. It is logical and it is expected for problems and an eventual citizens’ unhappiness to exist as it happens nowadays, in lower or greater ways, any legislative power, but the parliament in contemporary Constitutional Law is no longer nineteenth century, as it was during the 18th and 19th centuries; on the other hand, the modern executive does not only have legislative initiative, but also legislates through delegation or with its own norms and of equal range. As stated by a sector of the doctrine when these questionings are posed, would internal parliaments of each state member pass an exam similar to the one applied to the European Union?
Then criticisms to the text of the unsuccessful Constitution project appeared, considering among other things that it was too long. As we know, the first stage of preparation was entrusted to a group of notables able to systematize the content of treaties to turn it into a document closer to the citizens ; but alter its signing by the European chiefs of state, with evident legitimacy, it underwent a process of popular consultation which failed in Holland, then in France and its was paralyzed until failure. Even when it is true that it was a very long document compared to Anglo-Saxon tradition, the American one has seven articles that Project had about four hundred and fifty but, to honor the truth, the regulatory tradition comes from continental Europe and only Latin America has taken it almost to its maximum expression. Let’s not forget that the North Americans are characterized for being very practical citizens, both in politics as well as in law a pragmatic approach outstands which sets a difference from continental Europe. Due to this, up until today they have not produced great thinkers, like Plato or Tomas Aquino, but we can indeed find recognized entrepreneurs, politicians and also jurists .
* * *
The controversy about its juridical nature, characteristic of ius philosophical discussions of the old continent, that is, if we are facing a treaty or a constitution, we can say that except for the heading or title of the document which said verbatum: “Treaty through which a Constitution for Europe is established”, there is not a single place on the inside of the document of that Project which tells us it is a treaty; on the other hand, experience in research leads us to conclude that we should always “pursue the concept, more than the statement”. It is enough to revise that first project to realize that it contained the basic elements of a Constitution as we have already commented, it even had with a people’s defendant so as not to leave it without the last novelties of modern constitutionalism .
It was also stated that the European Union is not a State as a criticism that needs to further replica or comment. We take as starting point the idea that the concepts of State and Constitution were welded, as if they were Siamese brothers. We should not forget that constitutionalism, a movement which promotes the control in the exercise of power, is an idea whose roots can be traced back to the 18th century, with the Magna Charta to John Lackland from 1215; in contrast with statism which comes after, in the 16th century, as a result of the religion wars and which aims at concentrating power. The problem is that the ideas of codification, state and constitution arrived almost together to continental Europe, thus the confusion and error in associating one another .
Finally, the last observation sustained that the then Project for a European Constitution lacked legitimacy; nonetheless, we realize that, substantially, there was nothing new in that text that was not already current in the European Union; moreover, if we go back in history, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 approved through referendum, was not a reflection of a majority and reflexive citizen reading either, it was undoubtedly and important and successful symbol towards democratic transition, but only a few read it before and after voting, as it was the case of the project for a European Constitution when the first popular consultations were conducted with timid results. Which were the causes for its failure to be fully ratified? From our discipline, we think that the concept of constitution which governs in Europe and Latin America: limiting its finality as just the fundamental norm of juridical ordainment. For a French citizen, to think about something bigger than France and its symbols, something more important than its Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen form 1789, is to easy to digest and it is even more difficult than forgetting its currency, the frank, let’s just ask former candidate JEAN MARIE LE PEN, who during his presidential campaign offered to withdraw from the European Union ; due to this, even when it sounds like a paradox, the erratic concept of constitution played against a project for a European Constitution.
III. Constitutional theory in the light of the European integration process
Under which conception should we have understood the failed project? From the traditional definitions we know of Constitution: a document which organizes political institutions , a text which expresses the real factors of power ; up to the most widely spread of all, the fundamental norm of juridical ordainment , we should say that the Constitution is, first of all, a pact of limits of power to ensure a sphere of rights and liberties to the citizen. It is in this line that a constitutional text for Europe could be better understood, it was only about setting eyes on a classical vision of constitutional theory, which gathers the thoughts of professors LOEWENSTEIN, FRIEDRICH, KRIELE AND PEREIRA MENAUT .
Considering its historical origin, the Constitution is, let’s say it again, a pact of limits to the power of governors to ensure a sphere of rights and liberties to the citizens. From traditional conceptions, it is the only one which contains the finality of Constitution and which does not hide its liberal content; furthermore, the aim of stopping power is not opposed to the idea or organizing political institutions, neither is for it to be, as consequence, the supreme Law of juridical ordainment.
The problem arises when the idea of Constitution as a pact has passed to a second place, hidden within a conception which is more juridical than political, forgetting it possess a double nature. To think that constitutions are only at the top of a juridical ordainment, in accordance to KELSEN’S thesis, is a reductionist vision of its real sense and finality, since, from its origins the Constitution has always had a double nature: political, because it aims at limiting power, and juridical because it does it through the Law; besides, all constitutionality cannot be container within a code given that principles, la jurisprudence, as well as traditions are also part of the French idea of a bloc de constitutionnalité and, on the other hand, because the constitution was born in countries like the United Kingdom and North America whose law is open and not closed, as opposed to the countries closer to the continental Europe tradition . Therefore, we can see that even when a Constitution could last some time we would only be in the beginning stages of the construction of a great building . Finally, the idea of founding norm of an ordainment is not at all opposed with the norms which guide a totalitarian government, foreign to the recognition of liberties, and which impose a very different order than those of constitutional establishments. We think that the absence of basic values which would grant it a distinguishable content from non democratic models is an intrinsic flaw of this definition, regardless of the notable influence it has had in continental European counties and Latin America.
* * *
What would have been easier to explain to the common citizen? In this respect, we consider than asking a European for his opinion about the passing of a document which is supposed to become the maximum juridical norm of all Europe, should have been a complicated task for those who lack a minimum knowledge about law and its repercussions in politics and society; due to this, we think that it would have been more prudent, important and practical to start by explaining to the people how power would be distributed, that is, the situation of Germany, Spain and France and the other member states, since, not very deep inside, everything else will depend on this, like a stream crossing everything, for instance the exercise of liberties; in consequence, how can we explain to the English and the French that their own constitutions no longer govern in their Law, that now Community Law will govern with a text by the name of Constitution, or Treaty, or European Union? In our opinion this would spark Euro scepticism and, why not, chauvinism.
From a practical point of view, the passing of the now reform Treaty will not change any substantial issue of what is now known as European community law, in a few words: the material Constitution. But with regards to the first attempt to establish a Constitution for the Europeans, wouldn’t have it been better to explain to the citizens that Europe needed to conclude all the path it walked as a group with a rigid Constitution, difficult of reform, which would constitute the expression of a pact of all Europeans to confirm the commitment towards economical progress, but in freedom? It is too late now, but it is worth taking experiences useful for the rest of the process of integration path.
Finally, we should take into account that constitutional theory is helpful to understand many aspects of a problem which had to complementary dimensions, the international and the constitutional vision. We have specially devoted ourselves to the second one because when we refer to political institutions —the European Council, European Parliament, European Commission, Court of Justice, etc., — the competences, dispersion of powers, setter of fundamental rights and popular consultations, we are closer to the field of that which is constitutional than to that which is international, as if the first one received a token from the second one in an athletics competition right in the middle of the race. This is why, if nowadays the reform Treaty is in the process of being ratified and, among other amendments, it substitutes the term of constitution with that of treaty, in praxis only the statement will change, but not the content since we will always be a set of constitutional issues within an international document; something similar to using a glass wine to pour a fine scotch. After these considerations, we should take into account that the ratification process for the Lisbon Treaty is still ongoing, its final result will be a democratic decision of the European People; because of this, we wish to conclude this work with the words of Ortega y Gasset, since in one of his works, The Revolt of the Masses, we discover that he was one step ahead of his generation when he wrote:
”[o]nly the decision to build a great nation with the group of continental towns would tune the pulse of Europe. It would start believing in itself again, and automatically it will demand a lot from itself, it will discipline itself ” . He explained it in a few words, that is true, but he told us more that many books.
* * * * *
By Carlos Hakansson
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTEGRATION PROCESS
The process of European integration has suffered a strong acceleration from the middle of the decade of the 80’s, first with the Single European Act, but mainly at the beginning of the 90’s when the events that took place in the countries of the centre and the east of the Continent and, particularly, the unification of Germany, forced a series of reforms in the political-institutional structure of the European Communities. The political need to reaffirm the commitment of Germany unified with the European work lead to the negotiation and ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991, that introduced substantial modifications: the creation of the current European Union, the foreseen Economic and Monetary Union, Foreign policy and Common Security, the Cooperation in Matters of Justice and Interior, the European citizenship, etc.
Then, in 1997, a new reform took place by means of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Scarce in results, it left an open door for the celebration of a new Intergovernmental Conference that was developed along the year 2000 and which results were summed up in the European Council of Nice that took place in December of that year. The future configuration of the European Union centred the debates of this Conference that had a goal: to carry out the necessary changes for the incorporation of new partners to the European club. With these incorporations, the number of members will almost reach thirty by the end of the present decade, which will force deep institutional changes at European level which political effects move towards the internal environment, that is to say, affects the states members, their regions and their citizens.
As critics have pointed out with this last reform, it is certain that the introduced changes have not established the basis for the future Union; they are a kind of patches that have opened the doors to the states of the Eastern Europe, but do not definitely approach certain questions with constitutional relevance. Aware of these flaws, the Treaty of Nice has foreseen the celebration of a new intergovernmental conference in 2004. For its preparation the Convention on the future of Europe that develops its works under the presidency of Valéry Giscard, d’Estaing, former president of the French Republic is in operation, and has concluded the elaboration of a formal constitution.
Therefore, at present times, the debate on the political structure of the European Union has acquired greater intensity. Today in the academic and political environments or in the media the references to the Lisbon Treaty are frequent. In many occasions the language used is openly federal, although we are always in the land of the normative and of the politically desirable one.
Nevertheless, in the European Union we have already detected the presence of materially constitutional elements that have been developed along the years starting from the contributions of the states members and of the European institutions. For example, the proclamation of the principle of primacy of the European Right over the state one, the guardianship of fundamental rights or the presence of an elected civic representation, are samples of this material constitutionalization of the European Union which can no longer be seen as a mere international organization of uncertain nature, but rather as the one foreseen from the political and constitutional prism.
II. AN UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION
The constitutional discussions in the bosom of the European Union can be considered as novels. But it is not, because for decades the constitutional topics have been present due to the emergence of problems and needs of that nature, which demanded solutions of identical nature. We can affirm that the Union has experienced a process of material constitutionalization. In these moments it is to formalize, a constitutional reality already in existence; of formalizing a Constitution that contains a political-institutional and territorial organization at a European scale (not necessarily of a state). The constitutional effervescence that takes place seems to come from European politicians of different levels (European, state, regional) that have been aware of the need of writing up a Constitutional Letter that protects, that defines with more clarity the corresponding game lands.
Soon after questions arise that here and now have been just pointed out: how to coordinate that Letter with state constitutions, hypothetical summits of their respective legal system? How to elaborate a constitution for a political community that is not a state that does not have people in a cultural sense? Is it possible to conceive a constitution without a state? Will a future European Constitution have a constituent character and, in consequence, will it create ex novo the states and the regions?
Here we should begin to recognize that the categories and the classic positions highly state-like, since they hinder the understanding of that European reality. Most of our models and constitutional theories of state and Kelsen inspiration would imagine there will be a problem to confront. It is of little help marriages between the state and constitution, the constituent powers, the basic norms or the norm normarum, etc. The European constitutional reality – forget now about a future formal Constitution – seems to have gone without these concepts. Therefore, it becomes necessary to overcome these theoretical deficiencies.
The solution is found in the Anglo-Saxon constitutional conception that is the most appropriate for the understanding of that reality. In general terms, that conception is characterized because the constitutional matter does not wear out in the constitutional code, in the text. Also partly, the German constitutional theory is a more useful theoretical instrument than the classic continental theory. Furthermore, in Germany as in the United States they have lived under the federalism and they are used to the coexistence of diverse constitutions and political powers, etc. Actually, these theories have never been easy to apply. The German Constitution was elaborated under the supervision of occupation powers and was intended to govern temporarily until the reunification of the two German states took place.
The state members of the European Union still act as sovereigns and dedicate great part of their efforts to get it, in spite of the overwhelming weight of the political reality. However, it is unquestionable that it is not formally a state. But, it means this continues being an international organization seated in international treaties. We believe that the answer should be necessarily negative. Then, what is the European Union from the perspective of the political organization forms? We could say that it is a resulting entity of a federal process in which federal and international elements cohabit. In that process, not only the states and the European institutions play their part, but also the territorial political entities from different states: the regions.
Today, in the European Union we observe the presence of a sphere or environment of political or domestic character, comparable to a federation, in which the integration grade is high (for example, agriculture, competition, currency, etc.); on the other hand, we also detect the presence of another sphere in which the integration grade is smaller when compare to an international organization or a confederation (for example, foreign policy and common security). In the first of those two environments is where the constitutional elements that we will deal with have been developed and where they make sense.
In summary, for almost five decades certain constitutional activity in the European Union is detected. Indeed, for several years constitutional elements have appeared and looked for solving certain problems. That is to say, the European Union has experienced a constitutionalization process. In this process the states members and the European institutions have intervened, particularly, the Court of Justice. But some state constitutional courts as German or Italian have also collaborated. They opposed to some of the famous sentences that we shall mention next, but, with the time they were modifying their position until admitting the thesis of the Court European Court of Justice. The political and constitutional effect of this tacit acceptance by the supreme constitutional organs courts of the juridical-political construction carried out by the Court of Justice is enormous.
Many did not want, or were not able to, due to diverse reasons (political, juridical or ideological) see what was approaching. Others trusted in that the European fire would be something temporary that sooner or later, would fade out. Thus, only some decades ago, the discussion on the European Constitution was maybe a matter of entertainment for university professors or of idealists.
What has changed regarding two decades ago? The irreversibility of the integration process. Presently, there are few politicians that bet seriously to retrace the road, except in electoral campaigns. Among the citizenship this perception has been emphasized with the monetary union materialized in the suppression of state currencies and the setting up of the euro, which causes, without any doubt, psychological and political effects. Besides, we have to add the perception of problems (terrorism, illegal immigration, etc.) that demand answers in common, not unilateral.
Next, we will see how this constitutional magma has been formed and now sprouts before us, causing disorientation among some of our state rulers and the citizenship. For this exam we will differentiate two types of materials: the formal and the jurisprudential ones. With the former ones we refer to those contributions made by the states members from the creation of the European Communities until the present time, mainly, through the successive reforms introduced in the constituent Treaties; with the jurisprudential ones, we understand the contributions carried out, especially, by the Court of Justice, although they have also played a certain role in the high national jurisdictions.
III. THE ELEMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION
A) The institutions of the European Union
Indeed, the European Union has its own institutions. Here the first contribution carried out by the founders states of the European Communities with the creation of tasks and the fixation of goals to pursue – economic and commercial at the beginning. Then, other complementary policies arose as regional and social ones that were accompanied by the financial autonomy of the Communities. These institutions act directly on the citizens, which move them away from the international environment and bring them close to the political one.
B) The separation of powers
Related with the previous point, in the European Union one can affirm, contrary to the international organizations, that there is a dispersion or a non-concentration of power in a single organ. The main powers are exercised by the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the Court of Justice and the European Central Bank (independent monetary authority). Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize that the European Council and the Council of Ministers have a considerable number of powers and an enormous political influence.
C) The democratic principle
At the end of the decade of the 70’s, particularly in 1979, an event of a high political significance took place: the European Parliament’s election by universal vote. Then, the Parliament increased its powers. This way, the democratic principle has its space in the operation of the European Union, although in an imperfect way and for this reason it is said there was a democratic deficit.
D) The delimitation of competitions
Like what happens in the constitution of a federation, the Treaties sketched, although in an imperfect way, a territorial delimitation of powers, that is to say, they tell us what the Union can make and what the states members can make. For this, we should revise the different principles of the Treaties, that we will not find an expressed listing of competitions corresponding to the Union or to the states. This delimitation has also acquired its current configuration thanks to the work of the Court of Justice that has settled down, for example, principles like that of the useful effect.
E) Treaties revision procedure
The Treaties pick up a mechanism used expressly for their reform that forces the state members to follow it, as in a federal constitution. But, the approval of a reform demands the unanimity of the states, the same as in the juridical-international classic delimitation. It is an element that is halfway between the political and the international field.
F) The European rule of law
The European institutions act under what is determined in the Treaties and in the other juridical norms. In the event of a violation, there is a group of procedural resources to be used by other institutions and even by natural persons to demand its effective execution. But, the Court of Justice has also elaborated a group of juridical principles (that of contradiction of the procedure, in good faith, penal non retroactivity, etc.) that link to the European powers.
G) The protection of fundamental rights
The constituent Treaties lack a formal declaration of rights and freedoms, reason why in theory they would not enjoy protection in the European environment. However, this gap was filled up by the Court of Justice that, at the end of the decade of the 60’s, began a new jurisprudence line which tends to grant them artificial protection. Presently, there are numerous sentences related with the fundamental rights, so we can build a roster, by way of declaration of rights. We should highlight that, in this matter, the Court of Luxemburg took as a reference the European Convention of Rights and fundamental Freedoms of 1950; in the practice, it is possible to affirm that this was incorporated of facto to the Right of the Union.
Presently, from the Summit of Nice, where the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union was approved solemnly, the Union already has a formal text in this matter. Their political importance and symbolism are unquestionable, although it lacks artificial force. In our modest opinion it is advisable not to exaggerate the importance of this question since many of the rights that it has already considered have recognition and jurisdictional protection.
H) The Court of Justice as a Constitutional Court
Another constitutional element present in the European Union is the existence of an organ in charge of solving the conflicts among states members, among them and the European institutions. It is the Court of Justice that acts as a federal constitutional court.
I) The Principle of primacy
Since 1964, the community Right enjoys primacy over the state one. This was established in the well known sentence Costa/ENEL and reiterated in later pronouncements. Their inspiration is federal.
J) The principle of direct enforceability
In the sentence Van Gend & Loos 1962, the Court proclaimed the principle of direct enforceability of the Treaties, that is to say, the precepts of these last ones generate obligations for the states without any need of any state act of acceptance. This principle admits the direct applicability of the constitutional precepts that link to different public powers.
These contributions poured into the constitutional stream by the Court of Justice had, in spite of their juridical robe, an undeniable and important political consequence in the activities of the European Communities. In some way, they placed the institutions and the states members in some constitutional rails. It is appropriate to underline that the elements we have pointed out are incomplete and have been developed in an asymmetric way. But, ultimately, the result has been the operation of a real Constitution for the European Union.
IV. A CONSTITUTION? WHY NOT?
There are numerous voices that claim, taking advantage of the Convention on the future of Europe, the elaboration of a constitutional Treaty or Constitution of the European Union (for some with a merely pedagogic purpose that can be read and explained in the schools). But, considered as pedagogic exercises, what matters is that it defines a field of stable game between the European institutions and the states members.
It is important to notice that, thanks to the proposals carried out by different states members and to the creation of the Convention, the European constitutional debate is centred at the moment in questions of this nature (fundamental rights, delimitation of competitions, parliamentary powers, etc.), that is to say, it has specialized and it is possible to refer to an European constitutional calendar. Indeed, it is desirable that it is not contaminated with topics as the allotment of structural funds, the financing or the same amplification, etc.
Considering the matters mentioned in the previous sections, it is necessary to conclude that the work of the Founding European Fathers will consist in a mere summary, lacking almost completely of an innovative character. It is appropriate to note that apart from the outlined political problems, the constitutionalization of the European Union raises important challenges for the constitutional theory, mainly for the Kelsen inspired European-continental and in smaller degree from the Anglo-American.
A different question is the nature of that field, intergovernmental or political, since while some bet for the domain of the state, others lean toward a federal structure. Exactly, in these last years several European political leaders have carried out diverse proposals on this question. The most outstanding were those made by German and French leaders.
The first one in opening the debate at a political level was the German Secretary of External Matters, Joshcka Fischer in year 2000 who mentioned the creation of a European federation. In an openly federal tone the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder stated in April 2001 in the congress of the Social-democrat German Party. Among the most important aspects we can highlight: the European Commission should become an authentic European government endowed with more powers; the European Parliament would obtain more powers, would become the low camera within the Parliament system, while the Council of Ministers would be the high camera, like the Bundesrat. The Parliament would have larger powers, especially in the budgetary environment and agricultural policies. These proposals follow the German federal pattern very closely. Indeed, the German proposal was considered by France, among other states, excessively federal.
Without considering their concrete contributions, the general lines of the debate on the future of the Union are established in the French and in the German proposal; the two visions are the inter government and the federalist one. In next years, the scale will lean toward one of the two, although not exclusively. In any event, what seems clearly is that an enlarged European Union requires for its effective operation a more stable and more solid structure of federal type; otherwise, the risk that is waiting for its chance towards the Union is that of its paralysis or its dilution in a simple free trade area.
A) The allotment of competitions between the European Union and the states members
Closely related with the previous epigraph, is the matter of the allotment of competitions that entered in the European agenda regarding the discussions about the Treaty of Maastricht. Indeed, in 1992 this text incorporated the subsidiary principle to satisfy the demands of those that considered an excessive European intervention in certain matters. In short, the main pressures came from the German Länder that was not willing to tolerate the bureaucratic centralism from Bruxelles that weakens their political autonomy, in spite of the guarantees of the Fundamental Law of Bonn. Now then, this tendency towards centralization comes from an interaction between the Commission and the state bureaucracies (without any doubt the bed through which the centralizing normative are the diverse committees integrated by members of the Commission and of the states members; habitually this tangled committees are known with the expression “committology”).
The effects of this centralization affect the internal political environment of the states, especially in those whose internal policy structure is decentralized. This is the Spanish case where we have attended to a progressive recentralization of competitions in hands of the central State in detriment of the Autonomous Communities. Thus, the regional question is placed in first plane of the European agenda.
From then on the idea of elaborating an allotment of competitions between the European Union and their states members was taking form. Today, it is a central question in the European political agenda. The discussion lies in determining the formula to be used to make that delimitation (for example, roster of matters of the Union) and the matters to be attributed to the Union and under what character, exclusive or shared.
B) The reform of the institutions
This reform will point at a double direction: the elimination of weakness in decision taking and the democratization of this process. Therefore, it will be necessary to determine the role that will be carried out by the Commission, maybe reinforcing it to be transformed into an European executive endowed with democratic legitimacy. There are voices that claim for a reinforcement of the European Council and the Council of Ministers, that is, to deepen the intergovernmental line. In this operation, the Parliament will also obtain an improvement of its political position that implies an increase of their powers. Presently, in relation to the European legislative power, the creation of a third Camera has been suggested – that would unite the Parliament and the Council of Ministers- conformed by the state parliaments’ members. Other European institutions as the Court of Justice, the European Central Bank or the Committee of the Regions will also receive some finishing retouches.
On the other hand, it will also be indispensable to take a determination about the employment of the majority rule that should displace the unanimity rule definitively.
The other question that will consider institutional changes is the definition of the role to be carried out by the European Union in the world, that is to say, within the context of international relationships. In these moments the High Representative for the foreign policy of the European Union (colloquially well-known as “Mister Pesc”) and the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs coexist in its bosom. That is to say, the European external voice is divided. Obviously, we have to add the external activity of each one of the Fifteen. The relative proposals to this question point towards reinforcing the operability and the coherence of the European foreign policy so that, ultimately, the Union acquires a managing, active role in world politics.
In the end, these reforms bear at least an implicit pronouncement on the nature of the European Union. Said otherwise, it will be necessary to determine a confederation or to deepen in the intergovernmental matter if we want to build a federation.
The balance of the integration process is positive, in spite of the fact that it is characterized by the short step of the procession style and not by the long step that features military ways. In scarcely five decades, an integration degree has been attained that has allowed the creation of a common currency, among other achievements. If we establish a comparison with other historical processes of political unit (United States or Germany, for example), it surprises the road already travelled in Europe in so little time. It is convenient to remember that the European states and the national identities are very consolidated political realities.
However, the internal and external challenges that the European Union has to face in next years are paramount. In general lines, it will determine its internal institutional configuration and digest the social and financial policies as well, besides being trained to act within the international plane as an authentic political actor.
V. CONCLUSION
The phenomenon of the development of a constitutional dimension in the European Union which is no longer so recent can be considered, in a certain way, as a victory of the Anglo-Saxon constitutionalism: a victory of the non coded concept of constitution over the coded one, of the material over the formal one, and of the judiciary’s over the legalism, including the production of an European Common Right (which is not properly Common Law). Maybe we will get a Lisbon Treaty next year, but it still have constitutional matters inside it; actually, we think that the name is not a problem because we can show his fundamental elements anytime.
Finally, the traditional continental focus shows its limits when trying to explain this constitutional phenomenon. It is not a chance that the American and English authors come closer to the constitutional problem of the European Union with much more ease than the French, Spaniards or Portuguese, for example.
* * * * *
Carlos Hakansson
El Presidente de la República tiene la facultad de dictar decretos de urgencia; sus peculiares características hacen que tenga un tratamiento aparte. El inciso 19 del artículo 118 de la Constitución establece que el Presidente puede dictar medidas extraordinarias, mediante decretos de urgencia con fuerza de ley en materia económica y financiera, cuando así lo requiere el interés nacional y con cargo de dar cuenta al Parlamento; sin embargo, es evidente que su expedición ha sido abusiva. Si bien el Congreso peruano puede derogar o modificar los decretos de urgencia del Ejecutivo, se requiere más de la mitad de los votos de los congresistas. Es decir, una vez más las mayorías calificadas bloquean la eficacia del control parlamentario.
El abuso en la expedición de decretos de urgencia se debe a las siguientes cuestiones de fondo que atañen directamente a la debilidad del Congreso. En resumen, consideramos las siguientes:
A) Legislativas: el Congreso, siendo el órgano al que originariamente se le atribuyó la facultad de legislar, hoy en día tal es el volumen de la legislación y su tecnificación que se hace imprescindible la intervención del Ejecutivo.
B) Decisorias: por lo general el Ejecutivo mantiene al Congreso al margen de las decisiones importantes. Por ejemplo, en el caso de la negociación sobre el tratado de libre comercio con los Estados Unidos de América (TLC) y como consecuencia de la dinámica del sistema internacional, el ejecutivo se entendió directamente con los negociadores americanos con escasa presencia parlamentaria. Pero ello no se trata de un fenómeno reciente y local, al final de la segunda guerra mundial se ha producido un cambio en las democracias occidentales observándose una internacionalización de la vida política que ha conducido a una marginación del parlamento en los problemas políticos medulares y a la restricción en el ejercicio de sus mecanismos de control.
C) Corporativismo: el Ejecutivo se entiende directamente con los sindicatos, empresarios y comunidades indígenas para llegar a acuerdos importantes; en ese sentido, ¿cómo lograr que el Congreso pueda ejercer de nuevo sus funciones de control frente a la élite de expertos y técnicos de la burocracia y las asociaciones? Al parecer, existe una mayor probabilidad de éxito para los ciudadanos cuando tratan directamente con el gobierno.
D) Representativas: es caer en un lugar común afirmar que los congresistas representan más los intereses de sus partidos o movimientos que a los ciudadanos, y la mayoría de veces estos intereses no coinciden.
Finalmente, debemos indicar que estos problemas también se observan en los parlamentos de los sistemas presidencialistas iberoamericanos. Es decir, nos encontramos ante el resultado del predominio del ejecutivo en todo el sistema político, por eso es necesaria la formalización de partidos políticos a nivel nacional y regional; la barrera electoral y el voto facultad pueden contribuir a que sólo los movimientos más organizados (representativos) se mantengan en carrera).
* * * * *
Carlos Hakansson
I. INTRODUCCIÓN
Excelentísimo Rector de la Universidad de Piura, Dr. Antonio Abruña, Dr. César Landa, Viceministro de Justicia, Dr. Edgar Carpio, profesor de Derecho Constitucional en la Universidad de Lima, Dr. Jorge Monroy, Jefe de la Zona Registral Nro 1 Piura, distinguidos panelistas, representantes políticos, público presente:
La segunda fecha de los debates a nivel nacional sobre temas constitucionales nos invita hoy a tratar la conveniencia o no del voto facultativo, si esta reforma es imprescindible en nuestra Constitución y si es posible ponerla en práctica para las próximas elecciones generales. Parece un tema sencillo, práctico por decir lo menos, ya que en principio consiste en reformar la Constitución peruana sin mayores normas que la complementen, pero no así. En el derecho constitucional, como en cualquier otra disciplina jurídica, no todo es blanco y negro, siempre quedaran zonas grises en algunas decisiones que tomemos. Decidir por un parlamento unicameral o bicameral, repensar una nueva forma de gobierno, proponer un nuevo sistema de elección de magistrados, o un modelo de descentralización más favorable a las regiones, todo ello importa un riesgo, no hay soluciones que sean perfectas sino prudentes. Es en este contexto en que se inserta el tema del día de hoy y todos los demás a debatir en estas jornadas nacionales durante el resto del año.
II. LA EVOLUCIÓN DEL SUFRAGIO EN EL DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL COMPARADO
Deseo comenzar diciendo que, curiosamente, la historia del derecho al sufragio no empieza con la pregunta de este debate, obligatorio o facultativo, sino más bien con la extensión que debía dársele ya que al principio no todos gozaban del derecho a elegir a sus representantes. En el Reino Unido el sufragio era muy restringido, no todos los ciudadanos gozaban de ese derecho. Por ejemplo, los miembros del Parlamento, concretamente la Cámara de los Comunes, eran designados en función de la propiedad; es decir, se gozaba o no del derecho a elegir a un legislador en función a un título de propietario. Este sistema se mantuvo hasta la primera gran reforma electoral de 1832, gracias a la influencia de los elementos liberales que proclamaban que el derecho de sufragio debía generalizarse lo más posible. La reforma consistió en disminuir la importancia de la propiedad como condición para el voto, poniéndolo al alcance de los propietarios más humildes; pero, como la mayoría de la población estaba constituida por los que no son propietarios, se adoptó que el hecho de ocupar una finca en calidad de inquilino otorgará derecho al voto siempre que la renta llegue a una suma determinada de dinero; de esta manera se disminuyó el precio del alquiler para extender el derecho de sufragio a casi toda la población; pero sólo a los hombres, ya que el derecho al voto de la mujer fue una conquista posterior.
En Europa, a finales del siglo XVIII, se desarrolló un movimiento intenso de filosofía política, el cual despertó un gran interés por todos los problemas que se refieren a la seguridad que debe brindar el Estado. Es con la teoría del Contrato Social de ROUSSEAU; y la aparición de la obra de MONTESQUIEU, El Espíritu de las Leyes, cuando se empezaron a debatir los problemas que se refieren a la organización del Estado, la garantía de los derechos de los ciudadanos, entre otros temas.
Las teorías de la mentalidad dieciochesca sostenían que todos los hombres son iguales y libres; por consiguiente, la soberanía reside en el pueblo ya que el gobierno emana de un contrato entre los gobernantes y gobernados. Por tanto, todos los ciudadanos debían ser llamados por igual a participar en el gobierno mediante el derecho de sufragio. Estas ideas se propagaron por toda Europa y fueron el cimiento de una renovación en las instituciones políticas del mundo, en especial las que adoptaron el régimen constitucional, creando asambleas legislativas elegidas por el pueblo para que limitasen el poder del Estado. De este modo era lógico extender el voto a todos los ciudadanos una vez alcanzada la mayoría de edad.
La Declaración de independencia de los Estados Unidos del 4 de Julio de 1776 también proclamó el principio de que todos los hombres nacen libres e iguales; principio que fue renovado en 1789 al iniciarse la Revolución francesa. Sin embargo, en los Estados Unidos, a pesar de la Declaración, el sufragio también estuvo limitado mediante un sistema basado en la propiedad. Es con la Guerra de Secesión que se obtuvo la abolición de la esclavitud y posteriormente el derecho al voto. Este hecho histórico inspiró en 1870 la redacción de la décimo quinta enmienda en la Constitución norteamericana, la cual dispuso que ninguno de los estados podía restringir ni suprimir el derecho de sufragio por razones de raza, color o por la circunstancia de que un hombre hubiese sido antes esclavo.
III. LA EVOLUCIÓN DEL SUFRAGIO EN EL PERÚ REPUBLICANO
Para tratar acerca de la conveniencia o no del voto facultativo hay que tener en cuenta que se trata para nosotros de un paso más en la evolución del derecho de sufragio en el Perú. Para explicarlo, he invitado a dos constitucionalistas peruanos, uno del siglo XIX y otro del XX, para que me acompañen en la tarde de hoy. Se trata de MANUEL VICENTE VILLARÁN y JOSÉ PAREJA PAZ SOLDÁN, respectivamente.
El profesor MANUEL VICENTE VILLARÁN explicaba a sus alumnos que en el Perú se practicaba un sistema de elección anómalo, decía textualmente que no había otro país en que el voto sea más publicitado, ya que el sufragio se distinguía porque era público, escrito y firmado; tres características que no se corresponden con las reglas de una elección democrática contemporánea. En otras palabras, no estaba reconocido el derecho a un voto secreto ya que su publicidad era llevada al extremo.
Hoy en día las tendencias del constitucionalismo moderno han influido en los cambios que ha experimentado el derecho de sufragio, por eso vemos que la evolución del derecho electoral en el Perú nos ha llevado hacia el reconocimiento del voto secreto y universal para todos los ciudadanos. No obstante, pese a que nuestro país no ha podido culminar un proceso de transición democrática, las conquistas en materia electoral no pueden detenerse, por eso considero que proponer el voto facultativo es una de las metas que quedan para discutir en una Asamblea Constituyente.
En ese sentido, a nosotros nos queda exponer los argumentos a favor y en contra de esta nueva conquista electoral.
IV. LA INCORPORACIÓN DEL VOTO FACULTATIVO
En primer lugar, tengamos en cuenta que la Constitución peruana reconoce que el voto no sólo es un derecho sino también un deber cívico. El profesor JOSÉ PAREJA PAZ SOLDÁN sostenía que la obligatoriedad del voto promueve que todos los ciudadanos se interesen por la marcha del Estado, que se familiaricen con los temas, ideología y calidad de los candidatos, que afirmen su espíritu cívico e integren plenamente a la vida democrática la designación de sus gobernantes y congresistas por sufragio universal y directo.
No obstante, considero que las conquistas que suman en el derecho constitucional, la participación democrática, y los derechos humanos, siempre han estado acompañadas de la libertad pero no de la imposición; ya que la obligatoriedad no favorece la consolidación del sistema democrático sino evitar una sanción económica. Por otra parte, el voto obligatorio adolece de los siguientes problemas, algunos conocidos por los ciudadanos:
A) Promueve votar por el candidato menos malo. El ciudadano que no le convence ningún candidato tendrá que votar por aquél que le parezca menos malo o con mejores condiciones para ganar en las preferencias electorales, la segunda opción es conocida como el voto útil.
B) Promueve viciar el voto o dejarlo en blanco. Si nos damos cuenta, en la práctica con el voto obligatorio sólo se nos obliga a participar del proceso electoral (es decir, hacer la cola, llenar la cédula, depositarla, firmar el acta, macharse el dedo, etc), pero en la cabina secreta nadie nos puede conminar a dirigir nuestro voto por algún candidato; por tanto más de un ciudadano podría decidir a no emitir su voto; por ese motivo, cual paradoja, el voto obligatorio no obliga a decidirse por un candidato concreto.
C) En algunos casos, sobre todo en las zonas geográficas más duras del país, se viaja durante uno o dos días, se duerme en la calle porque no pueden pagar un hotel; todo ello por temor a la multa; y lo peor es que en algunos casos no conocen a los candidatos.
Frente al voto obligatorio, las razones que encuentro para considerar el voto facultativo en una próxima reforma constitucional o Asamblea Constituyente las puedo sintetizar de la siguiente manera:
El primero es un argumento más cercano a los fundamentos del constitucionalismo y la Democracia. Como sabemos, la Constitución desde su origen promueve la libertad política, por eso no es extraño que el voto facultativo esté reconocido, con algunas excepciones, en los países con larga tradición democrática y difusores de las ideas de la separación de poderes y reconocimiento de los derechos y libertades, como es el caso de los Estados Unidos de Norteamérica. Por ese motivo, así como existe “un derecho a elegir” este debe complementarse con la opción a “no elegir” cuando ningún candidato convence al ciudadano.
Es evidente que “el derecho a no elegir” también se manifiesta en el deseo de no querer ejercer el derecho de participación, de mantener su independencia política, de querer vivir a espaldas al sistema o probablemente no compartir los ideales democráticos. Frente a todos estos casos debo decir que uno de los mayores atributos de la democracia, sino el más importante, es que todos tienen cabida en él, por eso es el sistema de gobierno más tolerado por los ciudadanos. Los convencidos, los menos convencidos, los no convencidos; salvo los terroristas que además de no creer en el sistema son intolerantes e impiden que los demás participen; por eso no es inusual que busquen afectar los procesos electorales así como amenazar el ejercicio de los derechos y libertades.
* * *
Un argumento más centrado a la persona y su libertad individual es la inconveniencia para conminarlo a votar; podemos convenir en que el sufragio no sólo es un derecho sino también un deber ciudadano, pero no debe estar vinculado a una multa que sanciona su ausentismo a las urnas electorales.
Otro argumento que deseo compartir, este más vinculado a la política, es que el voto facultativo permite tomar el pulso a un proceso de transición democrática. En ese sentido, el ausentismo electoral permite evaluar el progreso de un proceso de consolidación de las instituciones políticas, de los partidos y el grado de conformidad con el sistema democrático. Desde este punto de vista, el ausentismo en las urnas es toda una fuente de información para averiguar las causas y ponerles remedio en la medida de las posibilidades de cada Estado.
El porcentaje de ciudadanos que ejercen el derecho a no elegir si ningún candidato presidencial les convence, se expresa en un porcentaje que es sumamente indicativo para la clase política al momento de preparar sus propuestas; ello los obligará a presentar planes de gobierno más serios y mejor estructurados; cargados no sólo de “qué hacer”, sino más bien del “cómo hacerlo”. La finalidad de la política.
* * *
Expuestos algunos de los argumentos a favor a un voto facultativo, reconozco que el principal inconveniente estaría en dejarnos llevar por el entusiasmo y aplicarlo mecánicamente en las próximas elecciones generales sin considerar que antes es necesario iniciar un verdadero proceso de transición democrática. En ese sentido, el profesor PAREJA PAZ SOLDÁN afirmaba que “cuanto más ciudadanos hayan participado en las elecciones mayor representatividad tendrá el elegido para actuar como expresión de la voluntad general de los ciudadanos”. Por eso, un significativo ausentismo en un proceso electoral podría cuestionar los resultados.
Ante estos temores es conveniente observar a los países que nos pueden ofrecer un ejemplo. Si bien en los Estados Unidos es conocido el notorio ausentismo electoral, no por eso se invalida una elección democrática. No olvidemos que estamos ante uno de los países con mayor estabilidad, con 43 gobiernos democráticos consecutivos y con una Constitución que ya ha cumplido los 217 años de vigencia. La sucesión de mandatos presidenciales y parlamentarios, el mandato vitalicio de los jueces supremos, hacen posible que se vaya gestando una tradición democrática que se consolidaría con el paso del tiempo.
Por otro lado, si bien la legitimidad de origen, que es la que obtiene el ganador de una elección, es sin duda un valioso capital político, considero que no necesariamente está asegurado, o congelado, durante todo un mandato presidencial; pienso que más importante es mantener una legitimidad de ejercicio a través de un buen gobierno, un trabajo legislativo que convence, y una administración de justicia eficiente.
* * *
Si nos damos cuenta, de todas las conquistas del derecho electoral en el Perú, el voto facultativo tiene especial relevancia, ya que a diferencia del voto secreto y universal, que pueden reconocerse en las constituciones formales y tener una aplicación inmediata, el voto facultativo demanda un compromiso de los gobernantes y la sociedad civil para empezar y concluir un proceso de transición democrática. Desde ese punto de vista, considero que paralelo a incorporar un voto facultativo debemos garantizar unos pactos que nos lleven a asegurar el sistema democrático, y eso se consigue generando con el tiempo un sentimiento constitucional. En primer lugar necesitamos una Constitución duradera y aprobada bajo un procedimiento inobjetable y de gran consenso. Las constituciones polémicas, aquellas de origen dudoso, por la sola fuerza de una mayoría y sin un previo acuerdo nacional, no sirven para iniciar una transición democrática. La nueva Constitución deberá reconocer el voto facultativo pero será necesaria una disposición final y transitoria que establezca su fecha de aplicación. Durante ese tiempo, el Estado y la sociedad civil deberá cumplir, progresivamente, unas metas fundamentales. A continuación señalaré algunas de ellas:
A) La consolidación de partidos políticos, debidamente formalizados, con líneas ideológicas definidas, planes de gobierno concretos, y no más de cuatro representaciones en el Congreso para garantizar la gobernabilidad.
Dado que el voto ya no será obligatorio, los partidos no pueden perder presencia en todo el territorio nacional, por lo tanto buscaran más militantes, se organizaran mejor y se preocuparan en formar a sus políticos para representar mejor a sus ciudadanos. De lo contrario ellos no los votaran en las próximas elecciones.
B) Un calendario de metas, donde cada cinco años se expongan a los ciudadanos los logros alcanzados y las tareas por cumplir para consolidar la democracia. No olvidemos que en nuestra historia Republicana no hemos tenido más de tres gobiernos democráticos consecutivos.
C) El voto facultativo obliga a los gobernantes a tomar medidas que le den prioridad a la lucha contra el analfabetismo, buscará aproximar el Estado hacia aquellas zonas en las que la cordillera o la selva le impiden llevar, entre otras necesidades, la educación cívica que los involucre en las grandes decisiones, como es la de elegir a nuestros gobernantes. De lo contrario la Constitución sólo será reconocida y vivida por la Costa.
D) Pese a que pueda sonar anecdótico, se necesita instaurar un día de la Constitución, sugiero el mismo día de su entrada en vigencia, que equivale a su fecha de nacimiento; una clara señal de que será la última y que se convertirá en el día marco para comentar los progresivos avances en la consolidación de las instituciones políticas.
* * *
Todas estas son sólo algunas metas por conquistar lentamente pero hay que realizarlas de lo contrario el panorama electoral será cada vez más incierto, debemos darnos cuenta que en los países con tradición democrática resulta casi imposible que algún outsider aparezca de improviso en la contienda electoral y gane las elecciones a los grandes partidos. Pese a que podríamos imaginar titulares impactantes en la presa escrita para graficar lo sucedido; en este caso, no podemos comparar una hazaña deportiva con una elección democrática. Lo conseguido por GRECIA en la EUROCOPA no puede suceder en la Política doméstica con un partido o movimiento sorpresa. Un conjunto de personas en torno a un líder carismático de ocasión, con un partido improvisado, sin militantes identificados, sin ideología, sin presencia permanente en todo el país, sin una tradición democrática que los comprometa y que sea el legado a sus futuros militantes; una formula que produce más daño que bienestar en una Nación.
Finalmente, el voto facultativo demandará la consolidación de los partidos, su presencia en los distritos electorales, la cercanía con sus representados, y que los ciudadanos tomen conciencia que la democracia es el sistema menos malo para la convivencia política, son las murallas de TROYA, o de KUELAP, que el Perú necesita para consolidar una transición exitosa.
* * * * *
Carlos Hakansson
Como su título nos sugiere, el libro analiza en profundidad los procesos electorales a la luz de la ciencia política y el derecho electoral. La lectura del índice podría llevarnos a un error si creemos que la temática seguida en cada capítulo se centra en la problemática electoral, pues, a la par, también realiza una valoración comparativa a las formas constitucionales de gobierno más conocidas: el presidencialismo, parlamentarismo, y el todavía polémico semipresidencialismo. La esencia del libro se resume en uno de sus párrafos cuando los autores nos dicen textualmente que “si sólo nos limitásemos a describir y mensurar las consecuencias políticas de las elecciones presidenciales sobre el número de candidaturas o (…) sobre la coordinación electoral entre los partidos y los votantes y su efecto más general sobre los sistemas de partidos, nuestro análisis quedaría incompleto” (página 87). En efecto, el estudio abarca más allá de lo técnico, pues evalúa los pros y contras de las formas de gobierno: los gabinetes compartidos y no compartidos (página 32), la tendencia moderna y mediática de “presidencializar el parlamentarismo” que se da en Europa (página 42), la necesidad de inclinarse hacia el llamado voto útil (página 57), cuando el candidato presidencial de preferencia puede ser el mejor pero con escasa posibilidad de ganar las elecciones, así que es mejor votar por otro, y una crítica al voto preferencial (páginas 50 a 51); todos estos temas son tratados con la debida competencia.
El hilo conductor del libro es la estrecha relación entre las instituciones políticas y el sistema electoral. Si bien este es el panorama de la obra que recensionamos, me gustaría realizar comentarios sobre algunas de las afirmaciones descubiertas en sus nueve capítulos. En una cita al Profesor Linz, los autores argumentan que “el presidencialismo es un esquema institucional menos favorable que el parlamentarismo para sustentar un régimen democrático” (página 9); en realidad, se hace alusión al modelo presidencialista que existe en Iberoamérica, que no se corresponde con el modelo norteamericano sino que se trata más bien de un régimen presidencial, donde el eje o razón de ser del presidencialismo no es el gobierno federal sino la institución presidencial reforzada con muchas atribuciones y pocos controles. Durante su lectura también destacamos una descripción a la Forma de Gobierno peruana (páginas 22 a 25), cuando resume sus rasgos más notorios en los siguientes:
1) Un presidente o jefe de estado elegido popularmente.
2) Un gabinete sujeto a la doble confianza del presidente y parlamento. Y,
3) Un presidente posee considerables poderes entre ellos el poder de disolver la legislatura y otros poderes legislativos (decretos, veto, referéndum).
Los autores nos muestran las ventajas y desventajas de las formas constitucionales existentes, pero si bien lo ideal sería optar por una forma de gobierno clara, presidencialismo o parlamentarismo, o resolver sus problemas con los mecanismos de cada modelo; cuando no se tienen consigo todos los presupuestos visibles, y no tan visibles, los sistemas híbridos se terminan imponiendo a los originales.
El análisis por estados iberoamericanos que realiza la obra es encomiable y de gran síntesis, diferenciando los temas principales de los accesorios. Al respecto, podemos comentar que la tradición constitucional iberoamericana ha sido distinta y de crecimiento desigual; por ejemplo, los avances de Brasil, Chile y Uruguay difieren de los de Bolivia, Ecuador y Venezuela. Para estos últimos, con sus avatares, retrocesos, e inestabilidades, el constitucionalismo ha buscado distintas soluciones, incluso ha llegado a realizar experimentos electorales de todo tipo pero sin mucho éxito. Un problema que ha dado lugar a que determinados sectores de la sociedad piensen que la solución se encuentra en los modelos autoritarios, instaurados por los llamados outsiders que dedica la obra en su capítulo siete.
Como sostiene el libro, en cita a los profesores Shugart y Carey, “las democracias presidenciales funcionan mejor y son más estables cuando el Presidente tiene unos poderes legislativos limitados, mientras los regímenes con fuertes presidencias han sido más proclives a la inestabilidad política e, incluso, a las quiebras democráticas” (página 77). Nos damos cuenta que nos encontramos a un problema que no es nuevo y que los autores del libro también tratan cuando nos dicen que “la presencia de un ex Presidente en la competencia electoral, especialmente en los países en los que se permite la reelección inmediata y éste es el jefe del Ejecutivo saliente, influye notablemente en el número efectivo de candidatos” (página 185). Los autores también analizan los sistemas de elección que cuentan con la segunda vuelta, como el peruano, y nos dicen que “es mucho más complejo y, de alguna manera, contiene una lógica que refuerza los incentivos para llegar a acuerdos entre las fuerzas políticas. En principio son necesarias la formación de alianzas y la negociación de apoyos partidistas para canalizar los votos de las fuerzas perdedoras hacia alguno de los dos candidatos” (página 160).
Con relación a los partidos políticos, los autores sostienen que “en las democracias parlamentarias, la ley electoral está estrechamente relacionada con los partidos políticos y las disposiciones institucionales específicas, y también tiene una notable importancia en la fragmentación parlamentaria y en el formato de los sistemas de partidos” (página 205). Y añaden que “el ciclo electoral, al margen de sus implicaciones para el sistema de partidos, puede llevar a dos perniciosas situaciones de “Presidencia minoritaria” sobrevenida: que el presidente herede un congreso hostil basado en una relación de fuerzas anterior a su propia elección como jefe del gobierno, o bien que deba gobernar con una mayoría parlamentaria adversa fruto de la celebración de elecciones parlamentarias durante su mandato” (páginas 217 a 218).
Finalmente, la lectura del libro “Elecciones y sistemas electorales presidenciales en América Latina”, de los profesores Crespo y Garrido, nos ha puesto a reflexionar sobre las soluciones y retos que le quedan por afrontar a la Democracia, especialmente cuando se piensa que es posible hacer viable una forma de gobierno, llámese parlamentarismo o presidencialismo sin un adecuado sistema electoral (y de partidos), lo cual pone en peligro la estabilidad democrática y esa debilidad podría ser empleada por eventuales candidatos, de estilo autoritario, que se valen de sus reglas procedimentales para llegar al poder y responder como Humpty Dumpty lo hizo a nuestra heroína Alicia en el cuento de Carroll titulado: Alicia a través del espejo, un diálogo que cito a continuación:
“Cuando uso una palabra”, dijo Humpty Dumpty, en un tono más bien desdeñoso, “significa sólo lo que yo decido que signifique, ni más ni menos”.
“La cuestión es”, dijo Alicia, “si tu puedes hacer que las palabras signifiquen tantas cosas distintas”.
“La cuestión es”, dijo Humpty Dumpty, “quién es el que manda”, eso es todo”.
*****
